Self-Help and Development Planning in the Yemen Arab Republic by Carapico, Sheila
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
1985
Self-Help and Development Planning in the Yemen
Arab Republic
Sheila Carapico
University of Richmond, scarapic@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carapico, Sheila. "Self-Help and Development Planning in the Yemen Arab Republic." Public Participation in Development Planning and
Management: Cases from Africa and Asia. Ed. Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor. Boulder: Westview, 1985. 203-34. Print.
10. Self-Help and Development 
Planning in the Yemen Arab Republic 
Sheila Carapico 
Virtually all contemporary development strategies 
stress the importance of participation by working 
people in both policy formation and the benefits of 
economic growth. Development requires .capital for-
mation for investment in the social and economic 
infrastructures. Unless development investments in-
volve mass organization, representing broad social 
strata, they tend to benefit only a minority of landed, 
administrative, or merchant capital elites. The result 
is an uneven pattern of development throughout the 
country and very often, declining standards of living 
for the poor majority. Moreover, numerous studies show 
that "top-down" programs for involving peasants in 
local organizations and investment projects have rarel~ 
provided a solution to the crisis of underdevelopment. 
Centrally dominated mobilization strategies may 
fail because of excessive bureaucratization, the atti-
tudes of administrators sent to the local areas, or the 
inherited mistrust with which peasants view centra~ 
institutions and other forms of external encroachment. 
Research has also shown tremendous variability in the 
capacity of local organizations, usually imported from 
outside, to improve real standards of living in the 
Third World. Some of the most pessimistic reports come 
from Latin American and African case studies, whereas 
there is more evidence of local organizations contri-
buting to the increase and equitable distribution of 
resources in Asia. Nevertheless, there is considerable 
variability within Asia and the Middle East. 
There is also widespread agreement that local 
organizations in Afro-Asian and Latin countries cannot 
be evaluated through the prism of the civic-rational 
morality of the West. Many observers have argued that 
it is unreaso~ble to apply Weberian or Taylorist man-
agement models to Third World institutions because the 
models contain certain ci vie and sociological presup-
positions which are not merely absent from the culture 
but incompatible with the existing system and relations 
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of production. Case studies have contributed to criti-
cism of the old modernization approach which assumed a 
priori commitment to civic values of democratic paF 
ticipation, rational-rules maintenance, and conflict 
resolution through the hierarchical institutions of the 
state. 
A study of Middle and Far Eastern cases suggests 
that the importance or weakness of an institution is 
determined not by its legal organization or even its 
internal management, but by its relations to other 
institutions in the national system. Two kinds of re-
lations are implied, first, linkages to other facets of 
the social and political structure and, second, one in-
stitution's viability relative to alternative channels. 
Uphoff and Esman's comparison of eighteen Asian local 
development organization systems offers the conclusion 
that horizontal and vertical linkages between and among 
institutions ~re the key to the strength of local 
organizations. In addition, local organizations 
should be evaluated in terms of their relevance to cer-
tain critical development functions: planning and 
goal-setting, administration and interest articulation, 
resource mobilization, and especially, the provision 
and integration of services. Relevance indicates the 
importance of one organizational system in performing 
these functions compared with the contribution of al-
ternative institutions (e.g •• the private sector or the 
government). 
Uphoff and Esman have identified a number of 
structural characteristics associated with the more 
viable developmental organizations capable of promoting 
relatively equitable access to services. First, there 
should be more than one level of organization, prefer-
ably the lower tier functioning at the 11eighborhood or 
hamlet level. Second, multiple channels should link 
the community to higher levels of authority; there 
should be alternative channels within the system of 
local organizations. However, too many channels or 
levels may unduly complicate or clog the system. In 
addition, organizations with multiple functions seem to 
be more effective than single-purpose associations. 
Although again, no association can be all things to all 
people. Third, politics and political competition or 
even conflict "must be accepted as inevitable and 
legitimate." If resources are being mobilized and the 
social infrastructure altered, there is bound to be 
politics. Fourth, there should be sanction both from 
above and from below, in the form of elections, audits, 
public meetings, and so forth, to ensure accountability 
to both constituents and government. Accountability to 
citizens is important to assure trust in the system and 
equity of participation in decisions and benefits. 
Accountability to the state is important because in 
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virtually all cases the state controls essential re-
sources for development. Finally, decentralization of 
operating decisions, though not the extreme of auto-
nomy, which implies weak linkages, enhances effective-
ness in the provision of services. The deconcentration 
or devolution of functions and decision-m5king is maxi-
mized by distribution of economic assets. 
Local development activities in the Yemen Arab 
Republic have made a major contribution to the exten-
sion of rudimentary services to towns, villages and 
hamlets during the past decade. Under particular cir-
cumstances, local and regional groups have mobilized 
capital for investment in dirt roads, simple water 
collection and distribution systems, primary s.chools, 
electrical generators and other basic services. Most 
observers familiar with other examples have hailed the 
Yemeni development cooperatives as an unusually suc-
cessful model for local participation in development. 
One study of forty-one local associatLons in seven 
least-developed countries show& the four Yemeni ex-
amples among the most viable. A number of Western 
researchers have concurred in the Yemeni Cooperative 
Movement's claim to uniqueness, calling it "grass-
roots," "participatory," and a "bottom-up" development 
strategy which demonstrates "the potential for indi-
genous organizations to achieve dramatic development 
results and trcome important, nationally recognized 
institutions." Several Western and multilateral tech-
nical assistance agencies have commissioned studies of 
the Yemeni development cooperatives and targeted pro-
grams to work through district development boards. 
Most close observers in the late 1970s also agreed 
that from the perspective of public administration, the 
local development cooperatives system is very weak. 
Local board members, officers of their central con-
federation, and foreigners hired to implement donor 
strategies in conjunction with the development cooper-
atives, recognized difficulties in staffing, record-
keeping, project maintenance, planning and budgeting, 
and interagency communication. These difficulties, 
inherent in the process of institution-building, were 
exacerbated by federalism, local feuds, peasant apathy, 
and corruption. The government and the cooperative 
confederation, as well as foreign technical assistance 
projects, have repeatedly stressed the need for in~ti­
tution building to improve planning and management. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the ap-
parent paradox of a managerial system which repiains 
administratively weak and yet has been notably suc-
cessful in providing very basic services. The Yemeni 
associations, while adhering to few of the conventions 
of public office management, have played a salient role 
in the provision of services and other development 
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functions. The apparent paradox is partially resolved 
through the application of the relevance and linkages 
criteria outlined above, according to which the Yemeni 
associations appear among the more organized. But 
there is also tension within the system between a real 
imperative for rational planning and resources allo-
cation on the one hand and voluntary local partici-
pation on the other. While participation in fund-
raising for local services has been fairly high, 
farmers' and townspeople's appreciation for planning, 
budgetary, and even elections procedures is limited. 
Efforts to routinize the activities of development 
associations often appear as central meddling in local 
affairs. Committed to local services, people have not 
necessarily viewed participation in formal central 
civic institutions as a means to this end. There may 
exist a certain structural contradiction between po-
litical, financial, and benefit participation at the 
grassroots level, and the imperatives of routinized 
rational planning on a national scale. 
If Yemeni self-help has achieved beyond its mani-
fest managerial capacity, it has done so under unique 
circumstances. The special conditions in Yemen in the 
past two decades are not to be replicated in other 
nations, nor perhaps even in the Yemeni future. The 
first feature which sets north Yemen off from the 
majority of Third World nations is the absence of a 
Western colonial legacy. The Turks made two long but 
ultimately fruitless attempts to pacify Yemen and the 
British empire declared a protectorate over the south-
ern slice of the Arabian Peninsula (now the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, with its capital at 
Aden), but north Yemen was never truly colonized. No 
Western legal or administrative forms were imported, no 
cooperative or civic associations introduced. No 
foreign capital entered the country. No railroads or 
other modern infrastructure were built. In the mid-
twentieth century Yemen was highly traditional, a pre-
capital~t as opposed to peripheral capitalist 
enclave. 
The second factor which distinguishes the circum-
stances of local and regional development activity is 
the weakness of the central state. Between 1911 and 
1962 the country was ruled by autocratic Imams. The 
state collected taxes, principally the zakat and 
various surcharges, but returned few public services. 
There was perennial resistance to the state from 
tribesmen and peasants in various parts of the country 
throughout the period, and a deep mistrust of central 
authority among the majority. In 1962 a military coup 
deposed the Imams. There followed four years of civil 
war in which Egypt supported the republic against the 
Saudi-backed royalists. The republic was victorious, 
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but there was a bloodless coup d'etat in 1968, followed 
bY a military corrective movement in 1974 and presi-
dential assassinations in 1977 and 1978. In the mean-
time there have been numerous border incidents (both 
north and south) and local insurrections. Since 1962 
and especially since 1974, the government has en-
deavored to staff service ministries with educated 
Yemenis, create national highway, health, educational, 
and electrification systems, secure its boundaries and 
legitimize its rule in the interior. During the present 
administration of Lt .-Col. 'Ali 1 Abdullah Saleh, who 
has outlasted most of his predecessors, true progress 
has been realized on all these fronts. The state is 
now perhaps stronger than it has ever been. Nonethe-
less, the government has only recently asr8med re-
sponsibility for the welfare of its citizens. 
The availability and dispersion of cash due to 
high rates of labor migration to the oil-rich economies 
of the Arab Gulf was the most striking feature of the 
Yemeni economy in the 1970s. During the peak of the 
oil boom, as much as a third of the male labor force 
absented itself from the farms and petty trades. Their 
remitted earnings reached an estimated U.S. $1.5 bil-
lion in 1979-1980. Because migration was so wide-
spread, most of the country's approximately seven mil-
lion inhabitants benefited either directly or indi-
rectly from this infusion of cash. According to all 
reports, the lion's share of this remitted income was 
spent on various forms of social prestige and direct 
consumption --- bridewealth, residential construction, 
home appliances, and furnishings, televisions and video 
machines, yard goods and jewelry, imported foods and 
tobacco products, and on the means to these luxuries, 
vehicles, roads, electrical generators, and water de-
li very sys terns. The government's capacity to tax re-
mitted income was limited to customs on legal imports. 
Moreover, most of this "unrequited transfer" never 
entered the banking system. Nor were private sector 
institutions capable of accumulating a significant 
share of aggregate remittances for investment in social 
or productive infrastructure. The widespread availa-
bility of hard cash contrasted ~~arply with a very low 
level of capitalist development. 
The very primitive level of services initially is 
also an important point. Until after the civil war 
most Yemeni women transported jugs of water for house-
hold use on their heads. Other methods were by donkey, 
camel, or on foot. Most people had never seen an 
electric light bulb or a motor vehicle. Some boys 
studied at mosque schools; the daughters of the elite 
had private tutors; ninety percent of the population 
was unlettered. Limited labor migration to Aden in the 
1930s, 1940s and 1950s had helped spread news of the 
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physical comforts available on the outside and dissent 
against the Imams. During and after the revolutionary 
war, awareness of and desire for commodities and 
services increased. In the mid to late 1970s access to 
hard currency and the economic open door made possible 
the importation of bulldozers, drilling rigs, gener-
a tors, pumps, pipes, and building materials. 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
There have been three stages in the evolution of 
what the Yemenis call their cooperative movement. The 
first consisted of extra-legal, informal, and largely 
uncoordinated project activity. Efforts to build small 
schools, water systems, and other simple services prior 
to the revolution were confined mainly to the area 
which had experienced the greatest commercial influence 
from the outside. After the end of the civil war, 
phase two saw the foundation of formal cooperative, 
welfare, and development associations by regional 
elites in many parts of the country. The government 
encouraged these activities in limited ways. In 1973 a 
confederation of development cooperatives was founded; 
the following year its president took over the govern-
ment in a military corrective movement. Subsequently 
the development associations were given a formal legal 
identity, empowered to receive and spend tax revenues, 
and accorded a role in national development planning. 
Development associations were organized in nearly every 
district nationwide, and each district was represented 
at the provincial and national levels via the cooper-
ative confederation. During this third stage the local 
development associations made a major contribution to 
the extension of road, educational, and water and elec-
trical services to the smaller towns and rural areas. 
In addition, agricultural cooperatives and a cooper-
ative credit bank were founded to encourage capital 
formation for investment in income-generating ac-
tivities. It seems that 1982 marked the beginning of a 
new phase in which the latter will increasingly be 
emphasized, following the completion of primary infra-
structure. 
The seed of self-help lay deep in the traditional 
society, but its germination came from the winds of 
change. Much of contemporary development practice 
finds precedent in Islamic tradition or local custom. 
Historically, limited public services and welfare 
functions were provided through religious institutions. 
Mosques provided public bathing facilities. Education 
and some gravity-flow water delivery systems were sup-
ported by the waqf, or religious trust. The zakat re-
presented a pious obligation to give alms; wealthy 
families were expected to give sometimes to the poor. 
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Both Islam and local traditions within Yemen tend to 
stress collective and community values. While tradi-
tional production techniques were primarily suited to a 
division of farm tasks within the extended family 
household, there were mechanisms for levying collective 
labor for emergency relief or other special activities. 
The principle of collective responsibility applied in 
the raising of blood money within a kin group and some-
times in tax collections within a village or tribe. 
Most efforts to mobilize contributions to a project 
have recalled these moral and primordial values. Some 
activities have been organized by religious dignitaries 
or by tribal shaykhs. 
However, it is possible to overstate the role of 
traditional values and affiliations in development co-
operation. Traditional society consists of animosity as 
well as affection; the extent of community cooperation 
should not be unduly romanticized. Preexisting insti-
tutions afforded only the barest minimum. of services. 
Moreover, the history of the cooperative movement shows 
its close association with two factors which ultimately 
contributed to the transformation of the1 ~mamic system 
-- migration and the liberal movement. Both were 
forms of resistance to or escape from political and 
economic backwardness, and to increased appropriation 
of a dwindling agricultural surplus in the form of 
taxes and crop-shares. Under the Imams, many thousands 
of young men left the fields for Aden and points 
abroad. Many of them hailed from the part of north 
Yemen known as the southern uplands, which was closest 
to the bustling British port. Migrants' associations 
at first provided insurance and communications ser-
vices, then raised funds to educate members' sons and 
nephews in Aden. Following this model, village as-
sociations in the southern uplands raised donations 
from migrants and residents for village schools and 
water tanks. Through migration and clandestine com-
munications, awareness of and demand f'or rudimentary 
public services spread. This became one of' the demands 
of the emerging anti-Imamic movement in the 1930s and 
1940s. 
Another issue associated with both the cooperative 
and the liberal movement was the release of zakat for 
expenditure in the region of its collection. In many 
regions local elites, both progressive and traditional, 
called for recognized bodies of regional self-govern-
ance. The republican movement also advocated rights of 
voluntary association and assembly, freedom of trade, 
liberalization of the press, secularization of· edu-
cation, and the creation of cooperatives to encourage 
agricultural modernization. 
The early self-help efforts) mostly ad hoc and 
short-lived, often combined traditional with reformist 
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concerns. Since one-room schools, cisterns or water 
channels, public baths, and wayfarer shelters had 
generally been maintained as charitable foundations, 
incremental improvements to these facilities naturally 
recalled religious and familial values. Projects were 
typically simple and did not require a special ongoing 
organization for their execution. The first organized 
development board which kept records of its plans and 
activities was the Hodeldah city town improvement 
board, established just months before the September 26, 
1962 revolution. Yemen's major Red Sea port was expe-
riencing some urban growth, commercialization, and 
light industrialization. The town board was formed in 
direct response to a fire which had destroyed a large 
section of thatched huts. The board kept records, 
collected some taxes on trade, hired some workers, pur-
chased vehicles, and drew up a plan for fire fighting 
brigades and drainage of unhealthful standing water 
after rains. Formalized in a way village welfare and 
projects committees were not, the Hodeidah association 
represented a prelude to stage two. The other major 
towns 1301lowed the port's example several years later. 
The first republican regime of Abdullah al-Sallal 
opened the door to poll ti cal and economic liberali-
zation and endorsed the principle of local development. 
Two laws in 1963 legalized the formation of voluntary 
associations for cl vie, charitable, or cultural pur-
poses. Although vaguely worded and permissive rather 
than proscriptive, the laws are often cited as a land-
mark for local development activity. But during the 
next four years the government was preoccupied with the 
war and other pressing matters of state. Very little 
attention or resources were diverted to public ser-
vices, especially beyond the major urban areas. There 
was talk of social and economic development through co-
operation, but little concerted action and no vertical 
or horizontal coordination of efforts. The first phase 
of localized informal self-help activities persisted 
through the civil war. 
During the war the perceived need for public 
services deepened. Unfortunately, the war coincided 
with several years of drought, which deprived many 
communities of their normal water sources and reduced 
agricultural output. In some areas the fighting de-
stroyed existing cisterns or footpaths. Tanks and 
trucks rolled into the countryside. The Egyptian 
soldiers sent to fight on behalf of the republic 
scorned the primitive Yemeni way of life and quite pos-
sibly exaggerated the modern services available in 
Egypt. The Y.A.R. government, with international tech-
nical support, constructed a paved highway from the 
seaport of Hodeidah to the highland capital at Sana'a, 
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and began work on roads connecting these two cities to 
the t9_lqrd urban center, the southern uplands city of 
Ta'iz. Vehicles, water pumps, electrical generators, 
radios, televisions, books, and bulldozers were im-
ported in increasing numbers, along with countless com-
modities and gadgets. While the war and the drought 
exacerbated the need for services, roads and imported 
innovations presented new possibilities for small-scale 
improvements. Local projects incorporated some new 
technology, but the magnitude of these projects was 
modest. Most organizational and project activities 
were undocumented. 
The declaration of peace in 1968 represented a 
turning point in many respects. One of the last acts 
of the al-Sallal regime was the release of a quarter of 
the zakat for local development. In November, the 
Quadi al-Iryani quietly replaced al-Sallal. Among 
other things, the new government created a Department 
of Youth, Labor, and Social Affairs to encourage civic 
and cooperative institutions and local self-help initi-
atives. Efforts to staff and strengthen the ministries 
of public works, education, and health reflected a new 
commitment to public services. Within the next few 
years, a large number of international donors (both 
capitalist and socialist) pledged support. Still, the 
task of providing basic infrastructure and services to 
a predominantly rural population in rugged terrain was 
tremendous, and the capacity of the state still in-
choate. 
The second stage in local development activity was 
different from the first in that specifically organi-
zational behavior became more salient. A number of 
regional, provincial, and urban associations were 
founded. These adopted formal names, development as-
sociation, local cooperative, welfare society. They 
engaged in constituent activities like drawing up by-
laws and budgets, holding public administrative board 
elections, and writing regional development plans. 
They organized such larger and more complex projects as 
regional roads and small town water systems, often com-
bining voluntary contributions with taxes and levies, 
and ministerial and even international assistance. 
There were several reasons for the trend toward 
larger organizations. First, there were limits on what 
could be accomplished relying on local resources alone. 
In many endeavors there were clear economies of scale. 
This was especially true in the case of roads in the 
hinterland; what a single clan or village could not do, 
many cooperating communities within a region could. 
There was also, of course, a political motivation for 
establishment of a new civic institution. For many it 
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represented a regionally based authority parallel to 
the lower echelons of the Ministry of Local Adminis-
tration, a potential instrument of local self-govern-
ance and symbol of relative autonomy from the central 
state. For the politically ambitious, the cooperative 
or welfare association represented a new arena defined 
by the poll ti cal currency of service projects. While 
seeking a degree of administrative and budgetary inde-
pendence from the center, many associations took pains 
to register with the department of social affairs in 
hopes of gaining ministerial assistance for regional 
and local projects. Leaders in some areas were also 
conscious of the potential for foreign aid, which they 
hoped would be more generous and technically competent 
than Sana'a's. 
Organizational activity was something of an elite 
phenomena in that most participants were literate. Two 
groups were mainly involved. The progressive or per-
ceptive wing of the old landed and shaykhly clans acted 
to stay the slippage in their authority under the an-
cient regime; and younger republican counter-elites and 
military officers saw themselves as a new generation of 
regional and national leadership. In founding develop-
ment cooperatives, these men hoped to marshal popular 
interest in improved services in order to gain conces-
sions from government, incidentally enhancing their own 
prestige both locally and nationally. Though neither 
radical nor altruistic, their appeals to public welfare 
and the cooperative spirit nonetheless seemed progres-
sively populistic in contrast with the old order. 
In the spring of 1973 two meetings were held to 
establish a confederation of self-help organizations. 
The meetings were attended by representatives of the 
government and of over two dozen self-help societies; 
there were a few other committedly federalist groups 
which declined at the time to participate in a national 
union. After some debate, all member associations 
agreed to a common name, which translated 11 terally 
means "local development cooperative society." This is 
usually rendered "LDA" for local development associ-
ation in English; in Arabic it is generally called 
al-ta'awun, which implies cooperative self-help. The 
purpose of the cooperative confederation, called CYDA 
in English for Confederation of Yemeni Development As-
sociations, was to encourage local development efforts, 
especially by seeking government and foreign assistance 
for local projects. Delegates to the second meeting 
elected an articulate young m111 tary officer, Ibrahim 
al-Hamdi, as president of the confederation. He 
praised previous self-help efforts, noted the weakness 
of the government in providing services, and called for 
greater cooperation both at the local level and between 
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development associations and government. To demon-
strate its backing for development activities, the gov-
ernment promised half of zakat for local projects. 
A year later, al-Hamd1 assumed leadership of the 
republic in a military coup designated the corrective 
movement, drawing the cooperat1 ve confederation into 
the national limelight. Al-Hamd1 promised greater gov-
ernment encourageme~~ for self-help in the provinces. 
In 1975, Law No. 35 authorized the establishment of 
development cooperatives whose purpose would be to 
foster communities' efforts to improve communications, 
health, education, agriculture, and general services. 
Development cooperatives in the towns and districts 
were authorized to receive municipal and custpms re-
venues in addition to half of the zakat. In 1976, 
nationwide cooperative elections were culminated with 
much fanfare and the promulgation of a cooperative plan 
partially attuned to the first national five-year plan 
(1976-81). 
Between the 1974 corrective movement and the end 
of the first five-year plan in 1981, the cooperative 
development movement expanded, diversified, and 1nst1-
tut1onal1zed. The expansion in project activities re-
flected the increased ava1lab111ty of cash due to heavy 
migration and remittances. Initially it seemed that 
growth in organizational and project activities rested 
on the leadership of President al-Hamd1. But the move-
ment survived his assassination and the politically 
uncertain tenure of his successor, Ahmad al-Ghashm1, 
who showed his support for the LDAs by raising their 
share of the zakat to three-quarters. Since 1978, 
'All' Abdullah Saleh' s government has concentrated on 
the financial and economic aspects of local development 
through agricultural cooperatives and the cooperative 
credit bank. 
During this third stage there was an exponential 
expansion of the numbers of development and cooperative 
ass oc1at1ons and the range of their act1 vi ties. The 
number of local development associations increased from 
twenty-eight in the first year to nearly 200 in 1981. 
The rapid increase in the numbers of associations ls 
explained by two factors. First, many of the regional 
and provincial associations founded between 1968 and 
1974 divided into two or several district associations 
after 1975. This fission was partly a response to 
administrative decentralization under the corrective 
movement, whlf~ reduced the size of basic adminis-
trative units. Second, interest in roads and other 
projects had spread to some previously inactive re-
gions, particularly in the north and east. The promise 
of regular revenues and of central assistance for 
district projects induced the formation of many new 
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boards. By 1981 there were LDAs in every district, and 
larger towns had their own development association. 
In addition to the increase in numbers of LDAs, 
there was diversification of the kinds of associations 
confederated through CYDA. In particular, several 
agricultural cooperatives were founded. The idea of 
agricultural societies had been proposed even before 
the revolution by intellectuals. Unlike the multi-
functional, services oriented development associations, 
whose membership was 1nclus1 ve within a geographical 
area, the agricultural cooperatives were economically 
oriented, specialized associations with specific ob-
jectives. Membership was voluntary in the form of pur-
chase of shares in the cooperative. Al though a few 
radicals had suggested collectivization (especially of 
state lands), the general consensus was that north 
Yemeni cooperatives should encourage rather than sup-
plant private entrepreneurship in farming. Thus the 
function of the agricultural coops were to make capital 
inputs more readily available to members and other 
farmers in a region, and to encourage the transl ti on 
from subsistence to market-oriented production. Activ-
ities of the cooperative should both enhance the pro-
f1tab111 ty of production and increase the share capital 
of the society through investment. For instance, 
farmers' cooperatives operated service and petrol sta-
tions or water drilling rigs, hoping thereby to both 
stimulate farm modernization and earn revenues for the 
society. 
CYDA moved its offices from an old Sana'ani house 
to a modern office complex on the airport road, sym-
bolizing its institutionalization. Gradually special-
ized committees and departments within the confeder-
ation (financial, foreign, technical and cultural 
affairs, afforestation, etc.) were staffed with admin-
istrative, clerical, and technical personnel. The 
cooperative press expanded from a mimeographed circular 
to include a newspaper, several periodicals geared 
towards popular audiences, a scholarly journal dealing 
with development issues, and the broadcast media which 
now reached every Yemeni home. At the provincial 
level, the coordinating councils, the presidents of all 
LDAs in the province plus the governor, a presidential 
appointee, established offices and acquired staff and 
equipment. Both CYDA and its provincial branches 
became visible institutions. In 1981 a separate law 
defined the legal sta\Uf of the confederation and the 
coordinating councils. Their prescribed function is 
mainly to mobilize, advise, and audit the activities of 
member associations. 
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ORGANIZATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS 
Both the structure and the operating procedures of 
the development cooperatives system have evolved during 
a period of more than a decade, and are still being 
refined. The preceding historical synopsis has shown 
that the impetus for these activities originated nei-
ther with the grassroots nor the center, but combined 
bottom-up with top-down and middle-both ways initi-
atives. Often simultaneous, but uncoordinated, activi-
ties at several levels, local, district, regional, 
provincial, and national, evolved into a multitiered 
system. Rules and procedures have never been cogently 
laid out in one document, but have emerged incremen-
tally via both legislation and praxis. 
The principle of planning and implementation, as 
laid out in various laws, speeches, and articles, 
leaves considerable initiative to the localities. 
Project proposals originate at the village or hamlet 
level and are passed upward through the district's de-
velopment board and the provincial coordinating council 
(CC) to CYDA and then to the relevant ministries for 
inclusion in the national plan. Once this planning 
exercise has been completed, the onus for initiating a 
particular project falls again to the beneficiaries. 
The actual community to be served not the development 
board, which represents dozens or hundreds of neighbor-
hoods and hamlets, is expected to initiate and oversee 
projects. 
Here is how the system is supposed to work. Each 
community, approximately 500 persons, elects one repre-
sentative to a general assembly of the local develop-
ment association. These representatives discuss the 
services needs of the community with their neighbors. 
Then the general assembly meets to elect from among 
their number seven or nine members of the adminis-
trative board of the development association (LDB). 
The board elects its own president, secretary-general, 
treasurer, and other officers and then meets with the 
general assembly to discuss their project proposals and 
plans. The boards should compile a district or town 
development plan on the basis of project proposals and 
estimates of its own resources, suggesting integration 
of individual community projects where cost-efficient. 
Next, the presidents of the development boards meet 
with the governor as the coordinating council of the 
province to aggregate and rationalize plans at the pro-
vincial level. Finally, three officers of each devel-
opment association attend a grand national conference. 
The cooperative conference elects from among its mem-
bership the administrative board and officers of CYDA, 
and draws together the plans of the various development 
associations into a national cooperative plan. The 
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CYDA board and their staff disaggregate plans by sector 
and forward them to the relevant ministries, public 
works, education, health, and sometimes agriculture, 
for incorporation into the national five year plan, 
along with ministerial priorities such as national 
roads, university and teacher training institutes, hos-
pitals, sea and airports, and so forth. 
One of the multiple connotations of cooperation is 
that specific projects receive funding from a diversity 
of sources. Most projects should draw on at least 
three kinds of resources: beneficiaries, the develop-
ment board's budget, and central matching funds. The 
process of collecting beneficiary shares has not been 
specified by central guidelines, but left to local con-
vention. The LDA's budget derives from three-quarters 
of the district's zakat, one quarter of the municipali-
ties tax in the area, a share of the 2.5 percent co-
operative customs tax, and other local taxes and con-
tributions as they are able to collect. Central 
matching funds for a locally initiated project were to 
be made available only upon completion of the initial 
stage or stages of construction. So that development 
boards could estimate their project expenditures on 
primary services, a formula for the proportional divi-
sion of financial responsibility among local, LDA, and 
central resources was issued. Project costs should be 



























(cost sharing determined 
by LOA and Locality) 
• If total costs of a water project exceed YR 200,000, 
the government may provide up to eighty percent. 
The specification of four project areas was not 
intended to limit activity, but these were the only 
sectors in which the government promised material sup-
port. Subsequently, electricity projects were rncog-
nized as legitimate local development activities, but 
the government promised only to eventually incorporate 
local systems into the national power grid. Develop-
ment boards were also theoretically motivated to im-
prove agricultural production as a means of augmenting 
their zakat-based revenues. The board was also sup-
posed to own ten percent of the share capital of local 
agricultural cooperatives, if any. Other projects, 
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which included tree planting, youth clubs, mosque con-
struction and repairs, and other miscellaneous activi-
ties, could be financed from local and/or development 
association funds, and might receive some central as-
sistance. 
The system was rather ingenious, in that it seemed 
to make the most of limited resources and local par-
ticipation. There was room for variations in associ-
ations' aspirations, financial resources, and interest 
and commitment. But the difficulties in routinizing 
the prescribed process were manifold. Turnout for both 
the 1975 and 1979 elections was uneven: in some dis-
tricts men assembled in large numbers, whereas else-
where few people voted. Likewise, plans submi.tted by 
village and neighborhood representatives ranged from 
detailed budgets for dozens of projects to a few items 
hastily scribbled on a bit of brown paper. There was 
too little time between election and submission of 
plans for careful review. There was no ~ormal way of 
incorporating the proposals of boards formed after 
promulgation of the national plan in 1976 into the 
national plan. Because of this last difficulty, the 
five-year cooperative plan was scrapped and a new 
three-year plan (1978/79 - 1980/81) was written. 
Adherence to the guidelines and regulations of 
CYDA and even to boards' own plans varied considerably. 
Nowhere did organizations operate purely by the book. 
Records, required by CYDA prerequisite to the release 
of centrally controlled funds, were haphazardly kept. 
Elections results were challenged after the fact, or 
members resigned. Fights and work stoppages were fre-
quent as one locality or tribe challenged another's 
appropriation of water resources, regional transport 
routes, or development associations funds. The govern-
ment turned out to be notoriously slow in providing 
funds, so much so that beneficiaries or boards, having 
already committed resources, were forced to make up the 
central share. Cost estimates often proved to have 
been hopelessly unrealistic. Boards found themselves 
unable to keep all of their verbal commitments. Few 
members serving between 1976 and 1979 understood all 
the procedures or appreciated the relevance of book-
keeping guidelines. From the perspective of the char-
actered rational management model, the system was a 
shambles. 
Nonetheless, in the third stage the local develop-
ment organizations displayed considerable strength ac-
cording to the criteria used by Uphoff and Esman •. This 
strength, it is suggested, lies in the fragile but 
salient linkages established within the system and in 
the relevance of the various cooperative organizations 
to economic and political change. · 
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Most of the structural characteristics which seem 
to characterize the more viable development associ-
ations in Asia are also present in the Yemeni case. A 
multilevel organization evolved through simultaneous 
activity at several discrete levels: within villages, 
lineages, or other local communities; within towns, 
especially among petty merchants and civil servants; at 
the district and regional levels; at the provincial 
level; and in Sana'a. These activities, which occurred 
spontaneously only in a few regions of the country, 
were generalized on a national scale. The result was a 
two-tier organization, with each tier also consisting 
of two levels. The top tier, the cooperative confeder-
ation, is divided into the central offices of CYDA and 
the provincial CCs. The local development organi-
zations likewise have two tiers: the development board 
and the general assembly. There has been greater 
routinization of official process in the upper tiers, 
but project activity relies mainly on the less insti-
tutionalized lower tier. 
The development associations are multifunctional 
and have engaged in a range of interrelated develop-
mental activities. Whereas roads, water facilities, 
schools, clinics, and electrification were each handled 
by separate ministries at the national level, develop-
ment associations engaged in various combinations of 
these activities. Roads were the main activity in moun-
tainous districts, but more water projects were under-
taken in the hot coastal plain. Again, this feature 
was not a product of design but a reflection of ini-
tial, unregulated project activity. In addition to 
actual project activities, the arena of the development 
associations provided certain state-like functions, 
including the occasional adjudication of disputer9and a certain amount of verbal interest articulation. The 
development associations also tax and have been respon-
sible for a national population census. Both the flexi-
bility and the mul tifunctionali ty of the development 
associations are related to the absence of other modern 
-civic institutions. 
The multiple channels are also more de facto than 
de Jure, or at least include both sanctioned and infor-
mal or interpersonal linkages. Some of the channels 
specified within the system are hypothetical or latent 
rather than operative, especially at the lower eche-
lons. Nonetheless linkages within the system approxi-
mate the criteria for multiple channels identified by 
Uphoff and Esman. These suggest that "(e)very function 
Qf rural development -- planning and goal setting, re-
source mobilization, provision of services, integration 
of services, control of administration, and claim-
making" should be shared between local and central 
organizations .20 Linkages among levels and elements 
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should promote formation of a system or network of in-
formation and resources exchange. These include both 
channels within the local organizations' framework and 
linkages to national, local, and private sector insti-
tutions. Comparison of the Asian cases indicates that 
the linkage function is performed more effectively when 
a number of channels operate concurrently, since any 
single channel may be blocked, monopolized, dysfunc-
tional, or otherwise unsatisfactory. 
Linkages represented by the emerging cooperative 
framework have been very important. Historically, 
development of the local organizations has been an at-
tempt to construct an alternative local or regional-to-
national linkage, alternative to the only preexisting 
channel, an appointed, rigid, and generally unrespon-
sive bureaucracy of local administration. In terms of 
local social behavior, every development organization 
is demonstrably tied into tribal or other traditional 
(but changing) power relationships. The ·self-help as-
sociation represents a third alternative, neither of 
the state nor of primordial society, but a means of 
bridging the gap between the two. The prescribed sys-
tem of project planning and implementation within the 
system outlined above represents a possible, but not 
the only available, channel for mobilizing resources, 
making claims, and providing services. The multi-
plicity of funding sources for most projects is an 
indicator of multiple channels. So is the fact that 
deviation from the prescribed procedure is more common 
than adherence to formal channels. 
Uphoff and Esman also offer evidence that decen-
tralization of control aids effective local organi-
zation. The optimal balance of local autonomy with 
central planning usually entails devolution of author-
ity from the center to the periphery. As already noted, 
the Yemeni example is atypical in that resources are 
widely dispersed with the system, not monopolized by 
the center. The zakat (and related surcharges) was 
once the principle means of support for the state ad-
ministration, but its contributioI2 1 to government re-
venues has declined considerably. Payment of the 
Islamic tithe was made voluntary in 1974, after which 
farmers could in good conscience pay to charity or 
local projects rather than the tax man. There were 
virtually no other regular taxes collected in the 
countryside, save those associated with local develop-
ment projects. The government had very limited ca-
pacity to tax the millions of dollars which entered the 
country every year during the late 1970s. The govern-
ment maintained only limited control beyond the admin-
istrative centers. The issue of localism vs. centralism 
has been salient in cooperative affairs, but it has 
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played out differently than in most bureaucratized, 
heavily centralized Asian cases. 
As Uphoff and Esman point out, decentralized deci-
sion-making ls best suited to technologically simple, 
small, and relatively inexpensive projects or improve-
ments; more complex and capital intensive operations 
are more likely to require scarce technical and mana-
gerial skills available only at the central level. The 
Yemeni experience demonstrates the same point. Ad hoc 
self-help groups served limited development functions 
where traditional solutions failed to satisfy new 
social needs, but more sophisticated services required 
more elaborate organization and linkages to the central 
ministries. 
The three stages of development of the Yemeni de-
velopment associations show an interesting pattern. 
The first stage was characterized by very localized, 
technically illegal and hence highly autonomous, activ-
ity on a small scale. In the second state there was a 
trend towards much larger organizations, at the supra-
reglonal and national levels. The third phase has been 
characterized by two countervailing tendencies, one 
centralizing and the other centripetal. In 1975 the 
government had attempted to enhance central hegemony by 
decentralizing local administration from the subpro-
vlnce to the district level. This move made it pos-
sible, though not mandatory, for development associ-
ations covering a wide geographical area to subdivide 
into district associations. Fission occurred because a 
wealthy district wished to keep its resources to it-
self, or because one or more districts felt their in-
terests were not served by the regional development 
association. Wl thin districts including towns, there 
often developed an urban-rural split whicn was resolved 
by the formation of separate urban and district devel-
opment boards. Where village associations were active, 
they too often sought recognized autonomy wl thin the 
district association, and represented a centripetal 
force. 
There have been numerous pressures for preser-
vation of local or regional habits against outside in-
cursions. The diversity of ecological and sociological 
niches in the country makes it possible for each area 
to claim unique problems, which outsiders cannot fully 
understand. Where self-help efforts had not emerged 
spontaneously, antipathy towards outside structures 
extended to the development associations. Where there 
was a history of local development activity, some par-
ticipants regarded the formation of central institu-
tions and rules as an effort to co-opt local efforts. 
Even where there was some local propensity to partici-
pate and trust in government to support local activi-
ties, neither working people nor elites were neces-
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sarily predisposed to operate according to rules formu-
lated at the center. In various places and at differ-
ent times during the first five-year plan period, there 
were incidents of armed resistance to the central 
state. It is interesting to note that in several such 
instances, associations calling themselves the local 
cooperative have continued to function. The particular 
circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s made it possible 
for local or regional associations to fulfill a some-
what independent statelike role. 
At the same time, there are powerful incentives to 
rationalize procedures by operating within centralized 
structures and guidelines. The strongest instruction 
in the imperatives of rational planning and budgeting 
is experience. While the initial costs of a project 
may be raised in one-time-only donations, grants, and 
collections, maintenance requires ongoing funds and 
supervision. A few examples of water towers which 
collapsed and generators which burnt out illustrated 
the necessity of technical planning. Contributions and 
donations were voluntary only during stages of initial 
enthusiasm or in modest quantities. Larger and more 
ambitious undertakings necessitated either the force of 
law to ensure beneficiary financing or outside channels 
of funding, or both. One or two projects could be ac-
complished piecemeal, with work progressing as funds 
become available, but to construct several services 
requires some forethought and setting of priori ties. 
The ambitions of cooperative leaders may also motivate 
them to operate within the sanctioned rules. 
The tension between localism and centralism is not 
necessarily a zero sum game in which the increased 
strengz~ of the one implied a loss of authority by the 
other. The development associations have been 
strengthened by their confederation into a rule-making 
body, in terms of vertical and horizontal linkages, and 
as measured by the services they provide. At the same 
time, the growth of the development and cooperative 
associations has helped extend state authority by es-
tablishing linkages between the state and residential 
communities. These include both institutional channels 
and physical linkages in the form of roads and some 
central-place services such as secondary schools and 
health clinics. 
The salience of the network of development co-
operative organizations in the national civic arena is 
virtually unparalleled. The 1975 cooperative elections 
were the first nationwide polling experience in the 
national memory, and the 1979 and 1982 cooperative 
elections were each better publicized and better at-
tended than the one before. Elections for municipal 
councils and for the constituent· assembly have been 
patterned on the cooperative model but have not matched 
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it in scope. When there was discussion of a national 
referendum on the issue of unity between north and 
south Yemen, the LDAs were recognized as the most 
viable ins ti tut ion for organizing such a poll. The 
second national population census, in 1981, was organ-
ized through CYDA and its member associations, and 
later used as the basis for dividing the cooperative 
customs tax among districts on the basis of population 
density. 
THE PROVISION OF SERVICES 
The real relevance of the development associations 
has been their provision of services to the urbanizing 
small towns and the rural areas. They have mobilized 
capital for investment in regional and country roads 
and other infrastructure essential to capitalist de-
velopment and contributed to increased rates of liter-
acy among modern youth. Many local development pro-
jects are stop-gap or semicompleted measures. Locally 
initiated vehicular trails are truly extensive but 
never paved without special central or outside techni-
cal assistance. Many schools were built with three 
rooms, with additional construction after three or more 
years of instruction warranted fourth through sixth 
grade rooms. The nature of water projects varied 
tremendously according to environmental conditions 
(anything from a cistern to deepwell with piped house-
to-house delivery) but were typically regarded as 
incomplete. The same was true of electrification 
schemes, which initially offered a few hour's service 
in the evening. Hence they do not compare in quality 
or durability to the government's development projects. 
But the numbers of small projects accomplished by self-
help organizations and the extent of access to coopera-
tively built services makes them important. Projects 
initiated by communities or development boards offer 
rudimentary services to far more people than government 
services. Whereas both government and private sector 
investments have gravitated heavily towards the three 
cities and a few medium-sized towns along the paved 
roads, cooperative sector investments are more evenly 
distributed among a predominantly rural population. 
Part of the managerial weakness of both the de-
velopment organizations and the government lies in the 
absence of reliable data and records on critical de-
velopment variables. All figures referring to land 
tenure, farm output, expenditures by government or the 
private or cooperative sectors, or international trade 
and foreign assistance are estimates. CYDA's published 
records reveal as much about the evolution of the 
budgetary system as they do about trends in expendi-
tures. Nonetheless, records of the first three-year 
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plan period, 1973-76, and of the 1976-81 plan, do indi-
cate the magnitude of development investments by the 
cooperative sector compared with the contributions of 
government and private investors. 
The first national three-year plan, formulated in 
1973, was a very preliminary exercise in defining the 
parameters 23of development expenditures and capital formation. The plan indicated general targets for 
growth in various sectors of the economy. Only two 
investment sectors were identified, the public sector 
and the private sector. The public sector was expected 
to provide somewhat more than half of all development 
expenditures under the plan, with the assistance of 
foreign donors. No mention was made of the cooperative 
sector. 
Thanks to the infusion of remittances, actual 
growth (seven percent) was higher than anticipated (six 
percent). Growth was registered primarily by the pri-
vate sector, which spent sixty percent more than plan-
ned. Although its spending increased dramatically in 
the last year of the plan period, the government fell 
short of its targets and relied increasingly on foreign 
assistance. 
Even the broadly indicated material targets of the 
plan were not achieved. Investment in agriculture and 
industry, especially, fell short of planned objectives. 
The increase in private sector spending occurred mainly 
in commodity trade and real estate. Total public 
sector development spending under the plan was YR 1.37 
billion (U.S. $305 million). 
The CYDA records, released independently, show 
total development expenditures during the same period 
of YR 180. 8 million ( $40. 2 million). Approximately 
two-thirds of this amount was raised in citizen's 
contributions of one form or another. The government 
had contributed about one percent (this was before the 
promise of more), and the difference came from over 
seven dozen reporting LDAs. By 1976, eighty boards re-
ported having cut some 5100 kilometers of rural roads, 
relying on beneficiary work crews and cash donations. 
Seventy-four development associations reported having 
built 581 schools. Sixty-three associations reported 
having worked on nearly 700 small and medium-sized 
water projects. Only eleven health projects were re-
ported by ten development associations, but twenty-two 
LDAs reported having contributed to eighty-five miscel-
laneous projects. Field observations suggest that 
these are reasonable counts of the numbers of projects 
undertaken, although the relationship between national 
and cooperative development spending should not be 
taken at face value. 
In drawing up the five-year d~velopment program, 
the Central Planning Organization (CPO) drew on some of 
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the lessons of the first experience. The second plan 
was more detailed and textured. Unlike the three-year 
program, which identified only two investment sectors, 
the five-year plan anticipated investment from the 
public, the private, the cooperative, and real and pro-
jected 'mixed' sectors. A significant share of financ-
ing wa~ expected to come from abroad, most of it in 
support of public and mixed sector investments. The 
public, the private, and the mixed sectors were each 
expected to contribute about a third of development 
financing. Projects by local development associations 
were expected to represent scarcely seven percent of 
total development investment. However, the local de-
velopment associations were indicated to receive only a 
tiny fraction of international assistance, so the co-
operative sector was e~cted to provide twelve percent 
of domestic financing. A World Bank study, entitled 
"Yemen Arab Republic Local Developm~§t Associations: a 
New Approach to Rural Development," concluded that in 
the mid-to-late 1970s the development associations were 
more effective than the central government in providing 
primary services to the rural areas. In the two fiscal 
years 1976-77 and 1977-78, government development ex-
penditures totaled YR 1751 million, of which YR 873 
came from the state's budget. During the same period, 
the development associations reported expenditures of 
YR 508 million, less than the central state, to be 
sure, but a respectable contribution. Clearly local 
development association spending was far higher rela-
tive to state investments than supposed by the CPO. 
The Bank report also points out that only a fraction of 
LOA funds went towards administrative costs. 
During the 1978-1981 three-year cooperative plan 
period, local projects' spending still did not conform 
to submitted plans. CYDA records show the relationship 
between planned and reported spending by development 








PLANNED REPORTED PROPORTION 
YR 615 YR 811.6 123% 
268 245.1 91% 
103 151.3 146% 
58 21.1 36% 
94 70.2 74% 
325 360.2 111% 
YR 1463 YR 1959.5 113% 
"Other" in these figures includes electricity, youth 
clubs, traffic triangles, mosques, and so forth. The 
miscellaneous category groups the activities of agri-
cultural cooperatives with foreign aid and CYDA direct 
investments. Expenditures on roads and especially 
water were higher than anticipated, as was foreign aid 
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to CYDA (negligible in the plan). Overall investment 
by the cooperative sector was higher than planned by 
the development associations, and considerably higher 
than planned in the national program. 
The records of the cooperative confederation also 
show that the bulk of local development project ex-
penses continued to be borne by citizens, both directly 
in the form of project financing and indirectly in the 
form of contributions to the LDA budget. The following 
table compares the contribution of local, development 
board, and governmental financing to ~7ojects reported 
to CYDA during two three-year periods. 
1973 to 1976 1978/79 - 1980/81 
% from % from % from % from %from % from 
Citizens Board Gov't Citizens Board Gov't 
Roads 72 28 62 37 1 
Schools 54 45 1 39 41 18 
Water 32 68 52 29 10 
Health 31 69 32 63 5 
Other 17 78 5 23 79 14 
Total Oir 35 -1- 52 38 --g-
The government contributed more to locally initiated 
projects in the late 1970s than it had prior to 1976, 
but still failed to meet its obligations according to 
the CYDA formula. The total central contribution in 
the latter three-year span was eight percent, mostly 
assistance for schools, electricity and miscellaneous 
projects. The development associations covered a 
slightly higher proportion of total costs in the second 
period than in the first. Their proportional contri-
bution to roads increased; they picked up the slack in 
government allocations to local education; and they 
were the primary source of financing for heal th and 
other, elective projects. 
Citizen's contributions declined from two-thirds 
in the first period to slightly more than half in the 
second. Local funding for roads accounted for over 
half of all local development expenditures between 1973 
and 1976, and remained the major items in the latter 
report period as well. Local resources also covered 
one-third to one-half of the costs of most school, 
water, and health projects. The category of citizens' 
contributions should not be understood to imply only 
voluntary or charitable donations but 21fvers a wide 
range of local fund-raising mechanisms. Variations 
in these are literally too numerous to examine. They 
have included charity drives and also taxes, levies, 
user fees, and various collective ownership schemes. 
They have varied not only regionally but from one pro-
ject to the next, according to the nature and cost of 
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the service provided. In some cases social control and 
voluntarism have served, but in others local adminis-
tration author! ties have enforced the obligation to 
contribute. What is significant about the extent of 
citizens contributions is that they represent multiple 
channels for resource mobilization, not specified by 
law but more or less tailored to a particular project 
effort. 
In addition to direct contributions to projects, 
local revenues provided a major source of income to the 
regular LOA budgets. The following table shows the 
composition of recorded LOA 2~comes for two periods of 
the national five-year plan: 1976-78, the first two 
years; and 1978-81, a three year span. 
Central incomes 
Local revenues from zakat 












Non-zakat local revenues contributed three-quarters of 
incomes in the first two years and over half in the 
last three years. Proportional income from the zakat 
doubled, reflecting perhaps some improvement in col-
lections as well as the rise in the official share due 
the development cooperatives from half to three-
quarters. Central revenues contributed an even nine 
percent to development association revenues. 
These figures demonstrate that the activities 
reported by the development associations have been 
financed primarily from noncentral sources. As noted 
earlier, the extent of reliance on informal financial 
channels is made possible by the unusual confluence of 
circumstances, large amounts of cash outside the formal 
banking system and practically untaxed by the central 
state. 
The relevance of the local development associ-
ations to capital formation and services provision 
during the period of the five-year plan was substan-
tial. Private sector spending was again higher than 
targeted, but tended to concentrate in the transport 
and trade of imported commodities and urban construc-
tion. The government made visible progress in the con-
struction of national infrastructure for transport, 
communications, education, and health, but its develop-
ment spending was lower than planned. Most of the un-
anticipated growth occurred in the construction sector, 
electricity and water, and public services. Agricul-
ture was scheduled for fourteen percent of investment 
under the plan, mostly from the private sector, but 
reportedly attracted only eight percent. 
Although a detailed account of spending during the 
plan period or other reliable data comparing investment 
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by the development cooperatives with private, public 
and mixed sector investments and foreign assistance are 
not available, all indications are that the self-help 
contribution has been considerably greater than the 
seven percent projected in the five-year plan. While 
the government, with international technical assis-
tance, has paved and culverted a basic grid of two 
north-sou th and two west-east two-lane highways, the 
development associations reliably report work on at 
least 15,000 kilometers of rural roads which now reach 
most inhabited sections of the country. CYDA records 
of expenditures in water during the final three years 
of the plan period represent ten percent of total 
national expenditures on water and electricity together 
over the five years. National expenditures in edu-
cation and health amounted to YR 1294 million, compar38 
with YR 266. 2 million for the cooperative sector. 
Whether or not these figures and proportions can be 
taken at face value, the overall relevanoe of spending 
in the cooperative sector to the development of public 
services has been considerable. The development as-
sociations have consistently raised and invested more 
resources than expected, often in the area where 
government has failed to meet plan targets. It is 
clear that the development cooperatives have been 
partly responsible for rapid growth in transport, water 
and electricity, and educational services. 
The relevance of development cooperation has been 
in the formation of capital for investment in very 
basic services to smaller towns and the more densely 
populated rural areas. The distribution of effects and 
benefits from cooperative projects has been more even 
and equitable both geographically and socially than the 
effects of foreign, central, or private sector expendi-
tures. While there is some tendency for local develop-
ment spending to concentrate in administrative and com-
mercial centers, this tendency is far more pronounced 
in both state and entrepreneurial investment patterns. 
Direct international assistance has also clustered in 
the urban areas and the most productive agricultural 
regions. Self-help activity defers to the other 
sectors in that LDAs and local communities tend not to 
pursue projects which private or state agencies seem 
likely to undertake. The importance of development 
cooperation has been in providing just those interim 
services which alternative channels have been unwilling 
or unable to foster. If there had been no local de-
velopment activity the alternative channels may_ have 
behaved a bit differently, but there would probably be 
greater inequities in access to services than existed 
at the beginning of the second national five-year plan 
in 1982. 
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In contemplating a new development program for the 
1980s, both the nation and the CYDA organizations faced 
new circumstances and challenges. On the one hand, 
there was a clear national imperative for rational 
planning and management of resources. With the end of 
the oil boom, remittances from the Arab Gulf into the 
Y.A.R. leveled off. But imports continued to rise. 
Faced with growing budget deficits and its first 
balance of payments deficit, the government called for 
"less consumerism and more inve~fment," particularly in 
agriculture and agro-industry. A certain level of 
services had been attained, but it would be necessary 
to further extend, integrate, and maintain utilities, 
roads and schools. The government sought to bring all 
primary schools under a unified public curriculum and 
to produce a new generation of literate men and women. 
Roads require repair after rain or heavy use, at least 
until drainage and embankments are provided. Work was 
in progress to bring the whole country into an inte-
grated twenty-four-hour-a-day electricity system. Urban 
heal th services had improved, but access to medical 
facilities in the countryside remained poor. While 
many communities still lacked adequate water resources, 
high rates of drilling and pumping in certain regions 
raised fears of depleted aquafers. Overall, the im-
provement in services, especially in the truly rural 
areas, was relative only to the very low starting 
point. 
The cooperative associations had provided very 
basic services and made a leading contribution to 
expansion of the national road network. They provided 
for some integration of services at the regional and 
local level. Agricultural cooperatives, still in their 
infancy during the first five-year plan, nonetheless 
represented a possible solution to the dilemma of 
private sector underinvestment in agriculture. In view 
of the government's incapacity to tax rural incomes, 
the mobilization of resources through informal and 
semiformal channels was impressive. The development 
associations provided necessary and sufficient organi-
zation for investment in basic services. Cooperative 
investments in roads and utilities facilitated the 
penetration of capitalism into the periphery and the 
emergence of a rural and semiurban bourgeoisie. Roads, 
schools, and other projects and the cooperative associ-
ations themselves constituted important material and 
institutional linkages within the Y.A.R., thus contri-
buting also to the augmentation of state power. 
The end of the first five-year plan period seemed 
to signify the beginning of a new stage for the de-
velopment cooperatives associations. First, in many 
regions what could be accomplished relying primarily on 
local resources had been accomplished. Rural roads had 
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been the most important development activity in the 
mountainous interior of the country, but new road con-
struction leveled off in most regions between 1978 and 
1981. With international assistance, the Ministry of 
Education was building more rural schools and assuming 
responsibility for administration and curriculum in 
locally constructed schools. Local development of 
water resources was seriously constrained by geophysi-
cal factors in some areas. One very rudimentary level 
of services had been achieved, but to improve this 
basic infrastructure required higher financial, tech-
nical, and managerial inputs. Heretofore the strength 
of local development associations had been in activat-
ing informal channels for technically simple projects. 
To raise the level of services now required greater 
degrees of coordination and planning. 
There was an effort to both rationalize and 
centralize local development channels. For the 1982 
cooperative elections guidelines were pursued for voter 
and candidate registration. The CYDA law of 1981 
formalized the identity and role of the cooperative 
confederation and the coordinating councils, and the 
participation of deputy ministers of public works, 
health, education, planning, and other government 
agencies on the administrative board of CYDA. The 
exact channeling of zakat from taxpayer to development 
board account had always been left vague, but was now 
to be collected centrally and dispersed to the LDAs 
through CYDA upon review of their accounts. Poor and 
sparsely populated districts which had been unable or 
unwilling to undertake self-help were granted an ad-
ditional share of the cooperative customs tax as an 
inducement. Village associations, which had been 
active mostly in the southern uplands, were discredited 
for their failure to respect plans and formal pro-
cedures; having formalized the central cooperative 
institutions, the government pointed out that the 
village associations lacked any legal basis. Steps 
were taken to encourage the more even and regular par-
ticipation of the district and town associations in co-
operative affairs. All of these represented efforts to 
institutionalize the system and to encourage new al~~­
cations of resources consistent with national goals. 
At the 1983 cooperative conference, emphasis was 
on investments in income-generating and productive 
activities. Development associations would continue to 
help provide public services, especially in the hereto-
fore neglected heal th sector. However, the new di-
rection in the 1980s would be toward projects which 
either generated revenue or stimulated capital invest-
ment in the private sector. It was therefore hoped 
that the cooperative associations·would supply insti-
tutional support for productive investments. While 
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diversifying away from very primary services, the 
development cooperative organizations would continue to 
support investments in projects relatively neglected by 
the government and the private sector. Credi ts for 
projects which promised a return on the initial invest-
ment would be offered by the cooperative credit bank to 
qualifying associations. Both local development 
associations and shareholder cooperatives should par-
ticipate in investment credits. In the case of LDAs, 
income from equipment or facility rental or other reve-
nue-bearing activities would be used to support truly 
public services, from clinic to welfare to cultural 
events. Shareholder cooperatives were expected both to 
provide services to a specialized group, farmers, 
fishermen, craftspeople, and to pursue corporate goals 
of capital accumulation for shareholder dividends as 
well as reinvestment. As with previous developments 
within the cooperative movement, this new direction 
called for widespread adoption of policies already 
practiced by some vanguard associations. 
Administration of a credit system and management 
of more sophisticated services will, of course, require 
tighter supervision than in the past. Centralization 
and routinization of process are further warranted by 
several considerations. Central initiatives are proba-
bly necessary to offset the increased peripheralization 
of districts and regions which haven't participated in 
self-help. From a national perspective it is crucial 
to raise farm and industrial output if a widening 
balance of payments deficit is to be avoided. More 
complex services, projects, and events will necessitate 
the maintenance of a system of files and more efficient 
auditing. This is especially true if investment 
capital is borrowed. Operation of any of the known 
investment projects, tractors, bulldozers, drilling 
rigs, service stations, agricultural experiment and 
extension stations, utilities companies, refrigeration 
of fresh fish, light manufacturers, and new irrigation 
schemes, requires both technical skill and office 
back-up. 
Although some Yemenis fear overregulation of self-
help, the Y.A.R. development associations and cooper-
atives are considerably less controlled than comparable 
organizations elsewhere in the Third World. The 
question now seems to be whether more management and 
routinization of process will make local development 
more efficient and equitable, or merely stifle the 
element of spontaneity and success realized in the past 
two decades. If the development cooperative associ-
ations are to have the same relevance in the 1980s as 
they have shown in the first development decade, major 
adaptations of financial and political practice will 
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be necessary. If self-help cannot evolve to accommo-
date more complex issues, then it will be necessary to 
conclude that the relative success of local development 
associations was a unique and fleeting result of extra-
ordinary circumstances at a particular stage of de-
velopment. 
NOTES 
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Esman, Local Or anization for Rural Develo ment: An-
alysis of Asian Experience. Ithaca: Cornell ni-
versity Rural Development Committee, 1974). Rene 
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7. John M. Cohen, et. al. "Development from Below: 
Local Development Associations in the Yemen Arab Re-
public." (World Development, Vol. 9, No. 11/12: 
1981), p. 1039. This article reviews the "fugitive" 
literature on development associations in the Y.A.R. 
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and Mary Hebert, Rural Society and Participatory De-
velo ment: Case Studies of Two Villa es in the Yemen 
Arab Republic. Ithaca: Cornell University Rural De-
velopment Committee, Yemen Research Program, September, 
1981). 
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9. I have argued this point at greater length in a 
paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association 
Conference in Philadelphia, November, 1982: "The Trans-
ition to Peripheral Capitalism in the Y.A.R." See also 
Samir Amin, The Arab Nation. (London: Zed Press, 1978), 
20,29. 
10. The best recent political history of the Y.A.R. 
is J.E. Peterson. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
11. The effects of migration and remittances is one 
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For a review of literature on the subject, see John M. 
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Economies: Yemen as a Challenge to Rural Development 
Strategies" (American Journal of Agricultural Eco 
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London, 1983. 
13. I have chronicled the history and the details 
of many points raised herein in my dissertation, "The 
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tives in the Yemen Arab Republic," for the Department 
of Political Science, SUNY-Bingnamton, September, 1983. 
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al-Lawah al-Ta'awuniyyah fl J.A.Y. (Sana 1 s: CYDA, 
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16. Under the Imams and the first years of the 
republic, the basic administrative unit was the sub-
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districts. he 1975-19Tocfocentral1zation made the 
district, or nahiyah, the lowest unit of national 
administration. 
17. The CYDA law, the 1975 Cooperative Law, the Co-
operative Credit Bank Law, and other documents pertain-
ing to cooperative organization have been published by 
CYDA, al-Ta'awum: al-tashriya'at al-Ta'awantyyah (no 
place or date). 
18. Inclusion of electricity within the priorities 
for local development was decided at the Fourth Co-
operative Conference, 1979. The formula for project 
cost-sharing comes from CYDA records. 
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19. For a discussion of the socio-political role of 
one development board, see Richard Tutwiler, "Ta'awun 
Mahwit: The Social History of a Local Development 
Association in Highland Yemen" (paper presented to the 
Conference on Strategies of Local Development in the 
Middle East, University of Maryland, September 1978). 
20. Uphoff and Esman, Local Organization, 70. Shar-
ing of responsibility maximizes both local benefits and 
central management and technical inputs. 
21. Mohammad al-Azazi, translated by Barbara Croken 
under the title "The Financial Resources of the LDAs 
and Some Possibilities for Their Development" (in al-
Ghad, No. 4 Year 3: Oct. /Nov. 1977). --
~~22. Uphoff and Esman, Local Organization, 79, point 
out that it is possible for each to draw strength from 
their cooperation. 
23. The first section of the five-year plan issued 
in 1976 is an evaluation of the three-year plan. Cen-
tral Planning Organization. Yemen Arab Republic First 
Five-Year Plan, 1976-1977 - 1980-1981. lsana' a The 
Prime Minister's Office, 1977), English version, 11-55. 
24. For allotments by investment sector, see pp. 
221-224 of the plan. CYDA and development association 
plans (pp. 341-342) include roads, schools, water, 
health, electricity, mosque, and environmental pro-
jects. Road building equipment for CYDA and fifty 
agricultural cooperatives were also indicated. 
25. The World Bank, 1981. Summary and conclusions, 
i - xiii. 
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between 1978 and 1981 is Abdu 'Ali' Othman and Hamoud 
al-Awdi, "The Yemeni Cooperative Movement and Develop-
ment: ·Participation of Local Development Cooperative 
Associations in the Projects of the First Five-Year 
Development Plan" (in Arabic: paper presented to the 
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it is wrong to expect that • • • benefits are equally 
shared within communities, people do make a contri-
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